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/DVpFXULWpVDQLWDLUHSRXU OHV IUXLWVHW OpJXPHVIUDLVHVWGHSXLVXQHYLQJWDLQHG¶DQQpHVXQHSUpRFFXSDWLRQPDMHXUHSRXU OHV
FRQVRPPDWHXUV HW OHV JRXYHUQHPHQWV QRWDPPHQW FHX[ GX 1RUG GH O¶(XURSH 1RWUH pWXGH V¶LQWpUHVVH DX FRQWU{OH GH OD
VpFXULWp VDQLWDLUH SRXU OHV ILOLqUHV GH OpJXPHV IUDLV (OOH SUpFLVH QRWDPPHQW FRPPHQW V¶RUJDQLVHQW FHV ILOLqUHV SRXU VH
FRQIRUPHUDX[VWDQGDUGVSULYpVGHODJUDQGHGLVWULEXWLRQHWDLQVLSRXYRLUDFFpGHUDX[PDUFKpVG¶H[SRUWDWLRQHWDX[PDUFKpV
QDWLRQDX[GLWVPRGHUQHV/DSOXSDUWGHVWUDYDX[WUDLWDQWGHO¶DGRSWLRQGHUpIpUHQWLHOVFHUWLILpVGHERQQHVSUDWLTXHVDJULFROHV
RXGH WHFKQLTXHVGHSURWHFWLRQ LQWpJUpH QHSUHQQHQWSDV HQ FRPSWH O¶RUJDQLVDWLRQGH OD ILOLqUH HW OHV LQWHUDFWLRQV HQWUH OHV
DFWHXUVGHFHWWHILOLqUH3RXUSDOOLHUFHPDQTXHO¶DUWLFOHDQDO\VHO¶LQIOXHQFHGHVUHODWLRQVYHUWLFDOHVHQVHEDVDQWVXUOD7KpRULH
GHV&RWVGH7UDQVDFWLRQ3OXVSUpFLVpPHQWRQFRQVLGqUHOHVLQFLWDWLRQVHWOHVSURFpGXUHVGHJHVWLRQPLVHVHQ°XYUHSDUOHV
VWDWLRQV GH FRQGLWLRQQHPHQW SRXU FRQWU{OHU OHV SURGXFWHXUV HW JpUHU OH ULVTXH OLp DX[ SHVWLFLGHV 'HX[ HQTXrWHV RQW pWp
UpDOLVpHVGDQV OD UpJLRQGX6RXVV-0DVVD-'UkDDX0DURF/DSUHPLqUHFRQVLGqUH WUHQWHVWDWLRQVVSpFLDOLVpHVHQ WRPDWH(OOH
IRXUQLWGHVUpVXOWDWVFRQWUDVWpVTXDQWjO¶K\SRWKqVHVHORQODTXHOOHSOXVODILOLqUHHVWLQWpJUpHHWSOXVOHFRQWU{OHHVWUpDOLVpj
WUDYHUVXQHVXSHUYLVLRQGLUHFWHHWPRLQVjWUDYHUVODPLVHHQ°XYUHG¶XQV\VWqPHLQFLWDWLI/DVHFRQGHHQTXrWHFRQVLGqUH
SURGXFWHXUV (OOH FRQILUPH TXH OHV ILOLqUHV OHV SOXV LQWpJUpHV VRQW OHV SOXV HIILFDFHV HQ WHUPHV GH SURWHFWLRQ GHV
LQYHVWLVVHPHQWV VSpFLILTXHV GDQV OD SURGXFWLRQ UDLVRQQpH /¶DGRSWLRQ GH OD OXWWH ELRORJLTXH HW GHV UpIpUHQWLHOV GH ERQQHV
SUDWLTXHV DJULFROHV HVW DLQVL SOXV LPSRUWDQWH ORUVTXH OHV VHUUHV VRQW GpWHQXHV SDU GHV VWDWLRQV SULYpHV SOXW{W TXH SDU GHV
SURGXFWHXUVLQGpSHQGDQWVGHVVWDWLRQV 
Abstract  
Fresh produce pesticide safety risk has grown into a major concern of North European consumers and governments for the 
last twenty years. Our study expands on safety control issues and gives insights into how fresh vegetable chains organize to 
comply with retail private safety standards and thus get access to export and modern domestic markets. Most studies on the 
adoption of good agricultural practice certifications and integrated pest management overlook the influence of food chain 
organization. Building on Transaction Cost Economics, our paper aims to fill this gap by studying the influence of vertical 
linkages, more precisely the incentives and managerial procedures crafted by packing stations in order to control farmers' 
behavior and manage the pesticide safety risk. Two surveys have been conducted to that purpose in the Moroccan Souss-
Massa-Drâa region. Our first survey of thirty tomato packers provides only mixed results about our first hypothesis: that the 
more the supply chain is integrated (from contracted growers to full ownership) the more the control of pesticide safety risk is 
achieved through direct supervision rather than outcome-based incentives. Our second survey of 86 producers confirms that 
integrated chains are more efficient in safeguarding specific investments in safety management, which results in greater 
diffusion of biocontrol and good agricultural practice certification within the greenhouses that are owned by private packers 
rather than independent farmers. 
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Fresh produce pesticide safety risk has grown during the last twenty years into a major concern of North 
European consumers and governments. Product standards and more recently process standards (Good 
agricultural practices and integrated pest management) have turned into the most efficient solution to 
control and reduce the level of pesticides on fresh produce. Defined by a variety of public and private 
actors, safety standards are implemented and controlled at different levels of the chain including retailers 
and importers. Accordingly, safety control has turned into a key issue for the development of 
Mediterranean fresh produce export and local markets (Martinez and Poole, 2004). 
Our study expands on safety control issues and gives insights into how fresh vegetables chains organize to 
comply with private safety standards and thus get access to export and modern domestic markets. There is 
a huge body of literature on the adoption of safe farming practices and certifications in agriculture, 
however most farm-scale studies overlook the influence of food chain organization in the adoption process 
and few empirical studies investigate inter-organizational factors.  
Building on Transaction Cost Economics (Barzel, 2005; Williamson, 1985, 1991), our paper aims to fill 
this gap by studying the influence of vertical linkages, more precisely the mechanisms and governance 
structures crafted by packing stations in order to control growers' behavior and manage pesticides safety 
risk. Our hypothesis is that food chain governance structures have different capabilities to induce 
compliance with safety requirements and encourage the adoption of safe farming practices.  
The paper is based on a qualitative study of the Moroccan fresh vegetable chain, followed by surveys of 
tomato growers and packing stations in the Souss-Massa-Drâa province, the main region for fresh 
vegetable production in Morocco.  
The paper will be organized as follows. Section 1 analyses the governance problems drawing on 
Transaction Cost Economics. Special attention is paid to performance evaluation, asset specificity and 
coordination issues. Section 2 presents the survey methodology and section 3 the management of food 
safety in the Moroccan fresh vegetables chain. To better understand how tomato buyers are managing their 
suppliers to enforce compliance, we then analyze in section 4 the relationship between the organizational 
structures of the supply chain (integrated production, cooperative, contract farming) and their governance 
mechanisms. In section 5, we study the influence of chain organization on the adoption of integration pest 
management and good agricultural practices by farmers. 
1. GOVERNANCE IN FOOD SAFETY 
1.1. The rise of private regulation 
While tariff barriers are progressively eliminated, non tariff barriers have been raised in particular in the 
safety and phytosanitary domain. Fresh produce export chains are mainly concerned with pesticide safety 
issues when targeting European markets. Although European consumers are more and more demanding as 
regards to pesticide produce safety, there is no true safety-based differentiation at the consumer level, 
which would justify a premium to be paid by the consumer (Combris et al., 2012). Absent such a market 
based driving force, public and private control of public and/or pesticide safety standards becomes the 
main spur of grower safety effort.  
Private control is exercised at different levels of the chain and by different operators (Fulponi, 2006), 
mainly over residues (Maximum residue limits or MRL standards), good agricultural practices (Global 




In the customer country, control is most frequently passed by public agencies at the boarder level and by 
private retailers and/or importers by direct sampling at the platform level or by having exporters send 
residue analysis and/or GAP certificates. In some countries, public/private co-regulation is implemented 
for residue control (Henson and Caswell, 1999). In the exporting country, most of the control is done by 
the exporter company on the product and sometimes on the production process. Public authorities may 
sometimes intervene when a public good is at stake, which is the case for customer countries with 
phytosanitary requirements (not the case of EU) (Codron et al, 2002).  
It is worth mentioning that the motivation for private control in the customer country may be exacerbated 
or mitigated by State criminal liability regimes and above all by the activism intensity of NGO consumer 
associations. Such institutional differences may have significant consequences on chain organization and 
the nature of standards imposed on growers. For instance, customers in countries with strong consumer 
NGO like Germany are more prone to focus on residue control while customers in countries with criminal 
liability relying on the retailer are more prone to require a GAP certificate and also to bypass the 
importer/broker (Codron et al, 2006).  
1.2. Explaining the adoption of sustainable farming practices 
The fresh vegetable sector is one of the most advanced worldwide in terms of control of the production 
process, with the development of integrated pest management - especially in greenhouse production - and 
an increasing focus on GAP certifications.  
For example, the diffusion of low pesticide input practices in French protected vegetable production has 
been assessed in a recent study (Brismontier et al., 2009). According to the authors, conventional pest 
control does not exist practically any more in French greenhouses, because nearly all of the producers are 
monitoring pests and reasoning their pesticide applications. Integrated pest management (thereafter IPM) 
implies the simultaneous control of multiple pests, their monitoring, the use of thresholds or economic 
injury levels to apply pesticides, and the integration of suppressive tactics, including the use of natural 
enemies or antagonists (Elher, 2006). Since the early 90s, research on the adoption of IPM and good 
agriculture practices has flourished in the field of agricultural economics. For the purpose of this research, 
we have reviewed 27 studies dealing with IPM or GAP adoption published between 1991 and 2011, 
representing 44 cases (Codron et al., 2012b)1. 
A first critical point for research is to define IPM, as they are many operational definitions according to 
crop, region, pest classes and government-sponsored programs (Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 1998; Kogan, 
1998)2. Most of farm-centered adoption models deal with the use of a single technique, generally scouting 
for invertebrate pests (Caswell et al., 2001; Fernandez-Cornejo, 1996; Fernandez-Cornejo and Jans, 1996; 
Fernandez-Cornejo and Kackmeister, 1996; Mcnamara et al., 1991; Yee and Ferguson, 1996). Other work 
try to explain the use of biological control (Caswell et al., 2001; Fernandez-Cornejo and Ferraiolli, 1999), 
crop rotations (Caswell et al., 2001) or cultural and pesticide-efficiency techniques (Fernandez-Cornejo 
and Ferraiolli, 1999). 
To avoid the shortcomings of binary response, researchers have measured the intensity of adoption, which 
may be assessed by the number or IPM techniques (Lohr and Park, 2002; Maumbe and Swinton, 2000; 
Sharma et al., 2011), the magnitude of their use (McDonald and Glynn, 1994) or the total workforce 
dedicated to IPM (Beckmann et al., 2006). Numerical, count or categorical data are therefore used to 
model adoption. Other studies modeled the diffusion of IPM with duration models, the dependant variable 
being the lag of adoption in years (Fuglie and Kascak, 2001).  
                                                 
1Recent literature surveys on close topics include Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) on conservation agriculture, 
Prokopy et al. (2008) and Baumgart-Getz et al. (2012) on agricultural best management practices. 
2For example, the EC define IPM as "the rational application of a combination of biological, biotechnical, chemical, 
cultural or plant-breeding measures, whereby the use of plant protection products is limited to the strict minimum 
necessary to maintain the pest population at levels below those causing economically unacceptable damage or loss" 
(Directive 91/414/EEC).  
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Studies on the adoption of GAP certificates avoid those measurement problems, as certificates are 
precisely defined by public or private regulations (GlobalGAP, Fair Trade, integrated fruit production, 
HWF VR WKDW WKH LGHQWLILFDWLRQ RI ³DGRSWHUV´ LV XQGHPDQGLQJ $VIDZ HW DO  %XUWRQ HW DO 
Cazals et al., 2009; Dorr and Grote, 2009; Kersting and Wollni, 2011; Souza Monteiro and Caswell, 2009; 
Mzoughi, 2011).  
The main findings of this farm-scale centered literature are summarized in Table 1. For integrated pest 
management, the positive effect of education, short trainings and access to extension services confirm that 
IPM is a complex, human capital and information-intensive technology (Carpentier, 2010; Fernandez-
Cornejo  )DUPHU¶V DJH KDV D QHJDWLYH HIIHFW ZKLFK VXJJHVWV WKDW ROGHU SURGXFHUV KDYH IHZHU
incentives to invest and may be more reluctant to accept newer techniques (even though their larger 
experience could favor a better control over complex techniques). Empirical results confirm that off-farm 
activities compete for on-farm managerial time and may present a constraint to IPM adoption (Dorfman, 
1996; Fernandez-Cornejo, 1998). Farm size, by far the most widely investigated factor of IPM adoption, 
generally increases the probability of adoption or the speed of diffusion. There are different explanations 
for this important result. Given the fixed transaction and information costs associated with innovations, 
there may be a critical threshold on farm size (Just et al.; 1980, Fernandez-Cornejo, 1998). Also, larger 
farms have more resources to manage complex processes (Carpentier, 2010) and size could be correlated 
to other factors, such as wealth or access to credit (Feder et al., 1985). Revenues are also sufficient to 
offset the financial risk of experimentation with multiple practices (Lohr and Park, 2002). Other variables 
associated with IPM are crop irrigation and biophysical environmental factors such as land quality, good 
soils (Caswell et al., 2001; Yee and Ferguson, 1996) and generous rainfalls, where greater pest and 
diseases pressure may be expected (Fuglie and Kascak, 2001). Other factors studies show mixed results 
(for example, crop diversification). Work on the adoption of GAP certificates (last column in Table 1) 
show quite similar results than IPM literature, although farm size has often a negative effect on certificate 
adoption (a counter-intuitive result that is not explained by authors).  
 






Farmer Age - 0 
Education + + 
Short trainings + + 
Off-farm activity - - 
Access to technical assistance/consultants 
aassistance/consultants 
+ + 
Farm/Capital F rm size  + - 
Importance of family labor  + NA 
Land ownership 0 NA 




Environment Soil quality/Land productivity + + 
Rainfalls/Pests and diseases pressure + NA 
Marketing Marketing contracts 0 0 
Producer organization membership NA + 
Source: Authors (See Codron et al., 2012b). 
+ : in most studies, increases the probability of adoption/the speed of diffusion. 
-: in most studies, decreases the probability of adoption/the speed of diffusion. 
0: mixed results. 
NA: variable not included in studies surveyed. 
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Regarding organizational factors, it is worth mentioning that the adoption literature concentrates almost 
exclusively on within-farm organization factors such as partial or full involvement of the head farmer in 
the farm activities, division of work between family and wage labor. With the noticeable exception of the 
relationship with consultants, food chain linkages are seldom encompassed. Only two studies test the 
effect of contracting on farmer behavior: marketing contracts have a negative effect on the adoption of 
pesticide-efficiency techniques in the peach sector (Fernandez-Cornejo and Ferraiolli, 1999), whereas 
forward contracting positively influence scouting for peanuts (Mcnamara et al., 1991). No study focuses 
on food chain governance. Work on certificates adoption provides some results on cooperatives: the 
number of years within a farmer group (Asfaw et al., 2010) and the belonging to large producer 
organization (Souza Monteiro and Caswell, 2009) positively influence GlobalGAP adoption. In contrast, 
FUHGLWDFFHVVWKURXJKIDUPHUV¶JURXSVKDVDQHJDWLYHHIIHFWRQDGRSWLRQLQD7KDLIUXLWDQGYHJHWDEOHVVWXG\
(Kersting and Wollni, 2011). However, the authors do not provide any explanation of their results. 
1.3. The role of food chain organization 
Governance problems 
 
In food supply chains, firms are faced with all sorts of organizational (or governance) problems. While 
some of them can be resolved through contracts based on pure outcome-incentives such as price premium, 
other ones need the implementation of non-standard vertical organization (Ménard, 2012). Contracts 
introduce predictability and allow people to allocate resources with greater confidence. They also allow 
market participants to share risk, and are used to motivate performance (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
Following the typology of Bijman (2007), we concentrate on three governance problems in pesticide 
safety risk management: performance evaluation (or measurement), coordinating interdependent activities, 
and safeguarding specific investments. All three are sources of transaction costs and potential 
inefficiencies. 
Performance evaluation. Moral hazard may be used to qualify a principal-agent issue, where the 
principal has imperfect information regarding the actions that the other party takes during the 
implementation of the contract. The issue is related to problems of behavioral uncertainty, evaluating 
individual performance (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and measuring product or asset characteristics 
(Barzel, 1982, 2005). In the case of fresh vegetables, the effort to reduce the level of pesticide residues is 
unobservable to the buyer. The grower has therefore an incentive to cheat and under-supply safety, 
because he will benefit from the buyer company safety-based reputation on the end market without 
bearing the costs of safe farming practices. Note that the free-riding problem is similar within vegetable 
cooperatives, where the cooperative safety reputation on the end-market is a common property resource of 
the grower members. In the greenhouse tomato industry, the farmer costs to comply with safety 
requirements at the farm level include extra labor (scouting for insects and diseases, elimination of 
contaminated plants, etc.), additional inputs (low toxicity pesticides, resistant crop varieties, pheromone 
traps, etc.) and material investments (for example insect nets and curtains). It also includes opportunity 
costs such as the respect of pre-harvest interval. Moreover, those good practices and IPM techniques are 
supported by costly consulting services and grower trainings so that an opportunistic grower will try to 
save on these costs (Figure 1). 
Safeguarding. The second main contractual hazard is the risk of hold-up over the quasi-rent created by a 
specific asset investment (Alchian and Woodward, 1987; Williamson, 1985). Asset specificity, which 
features as a key source of contractual hazards in Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), encompasses 
investments (land, material, technical, immaterial, and human assets) that increase the productivity or 
quality of a process, but have little or no value elsewhere. They are sunk costs and increase the bilateral 
dependency between trade partners. In marketing channels, asset specificity relates particularly to 
knowledge of original methods of sale (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). In the broiler industry, commitment 
to factory farming requires substantial physical investments at farm level; in the event of the purchaser 
backing out, switching costs may be high if there are few alternative partners within a reasonable 
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commuting distance (Knoeber, 1989). In the wine industry, yield limitation imposed by the buyer with the 
aim of increasing quality may be considered as a dedicated asset (Codron et al., 2012a). Producers of 
SHULVKDEOH IUXLWV DQG YHJHWDEOHV DUH SDUWLFXODUO\ YXOQHUDEOH WR EX\HU¶V RSSRUWXQLVWLF EHKDYLRU 0DVWHQ
2000). As asset specificity creates dependence, the contractual relationship becomes costly if there is a risk 
of a contracting party deciding to breach the initial contract, or threatening to do so in order to renegotiate 
more favorable terms. In the fresh vegetables sector, the most advanced exporters in terms of safety 
management have heavily invested in traceability systems and food packaging certification (BRC, IFS, 
ISO, etc.). They also actively brand their products as safe and environmentally-friendly. On the producer 
side, the fine-tuning of pesticides risk management includes demanding alternative techniques such as 
biocontrol and organic farming, and managerial investment to comply with farm certificates (Global GAP, 
Tesco). 
Coordination of interdependent activities. According to Williamson (1991), adaptation is the central 
economic problem. The interaction between bounded rationality and environmental uncertainty increases 
the costs of adapting formal contractual agreements. These transaction costs include the costs of gathering 
and processing information, organizing decision-making, and an opportunity cost of lost synergy (Bijman, 
2007). Coordination costs make incomplete contracting appealing for buyers and sellers. In this case, 
some residual decision rights are allocated to one or the other trade partner, to make joint adaptation. The 
rights over non contractible actions may be called residual rights (or economic rights), as opposed to the 
specific or legal rights that may be included as a formal clause in a contract (Demsetz, 1998). In food 
safety management, an example is compliance with MRL, which is simultaneously dependent upon farm 
decisions (date of pesticide application) and supply chain constraints (harvest packing and shipping). 
  
Properties of governance structures 
 
Governance mechanisms are embedded in governance structures, which are classically defined in 
Transaction Cost Economics as market, hybrid and hierarchy (Williamson, 1991). Those canonical 
governance structures have different properties (Williamson, 1991). Markets are providing outcome-based 
incentives, with competition between third-party suppliers and buyers and performance rewards used to 
provide incentive-alignment (for example in agricultural marketing contracts). If the legal system helps to 
resolve commercial disputes, markets however lack strong safeguards to prevent rent appropriation. 
Conversely, in hierarchies, resources are integrated into a single command. Firms use direct supervision, 
monitoring and internal dispute settlement procedures to align incentives. The incentive intensity is lower 
ZLWKLQKLHUDUFKLHVEHFDXVHZRUNHUV¶FRPSHQVDWLRQLVQRWRQO\OLQNHGWRLQGLYLGXDOSHrformance, but also 
to the willingness to cooperate and accommodate work changes (Bijman, 2007). Firms use standard 
operating procedures, but also encourage permanent mutual adjustments, which are especially useful when 
it necessary to jointly adapt interdependent activities in face of high environmental uncertainty (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992; Williamson, 1991).  
 








Market Hybrid Hierarchy 
Performance evaluation Outcome-based incentives  ++ + 0 
Administrative controls 0 + ++ 
Coordination of 
interdependent activities 
Decision rights 0 + ++ 
Safeguarding Ownership 0 0/+ ++ 
Semi-strong safeguards 0 + 0 
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Ménard (2012) emphasizes WKHUROHRIDXWKRULW\LQH[HUFLVLQJFRQWURORYHUDQGLQVWLOOLQJ³GLVFLSOLQH´LQWKH
members of hybrid organizations. Authority is only exerted on a limited subset of rights, and because it is 
based on mutual consent, it is different from the relationship within a firm, where the worker is 
subordinated to hierarchical ties. In subcontracting, one firm has extended decision rights to adapt the 
contract (Ménard, 2012). In this case, the transfer of decision rights could be an efficient way to reduces 
transaction costs, but it leads to the possibility of opportunistic behavior on the part of the principal 
(Barzel, 2005; Arrunada et al., 2005). As a result, the agent accepts to transfer rights only if he is granted 
monetary advantages or can benefit from efficient private enforcement mechanisms, such as social norms, 
relational trust, or reputation. 
 
Governance mechanisms in safety risk management 
 
Outcome-based incentives. Contracts with pricing schemes such as quality-contingent payment (bonuses 
or penalties) are used to channel an agent's efforts in a particular way. They are routinely incorporated into 
marketing contracts in food chains (Hueth et al., 1999; Jang and Olson, 2010). In the livestock industry, 
contracts with carcass merit program based on grading are replacing traditional auction markets and over-
the-counter agreements (Hueth and Lawrence, 2006; Mazé and Ménard, 2010). Jang and Sykuta (2009) 
show that marketing contracts could be used not only to provide incentives for quality in hog procurement, 
but also to increase inter-temporal consistency, with price and non-price provisions designed to enforce 
the packer's quality requirements over the duration of the contract.  
The combination of outcome-based rewards and product quality measurement provide strong incentives to 
growers. In the case of pesticides safety management, vegetable buyers are using penalties (downgrading 
of harvest) rather than quality-contingent payment. The threat of contract termination for non-compliance 
is another strong incentive. Compliance is assessed with residues analysis and the implementation of 
residue control plans. 
Administrative controls. When food output measurement is difficult, a solution may be to monitor and 
control farm input, provided that such action is not itself too costly. More generally, administrative 
controls are an alternative mechanism to outcome-based incentives (Williamson, 1991). They are of 
course widely used within vertically integrated organizations, with internal quality procedures. They are 
also a feature of production contracts. Input control is becoming popular in the grain and oilseeds chains 
to overcome contractual hazards associated with difficult-to-measure quality (Lambert and Wilson, 2003, 
Sykuta and Parcell, 2002). Quasi-vertical integration is widespread in the broiler industry worldwide 
(Knoeber, 1989; Ménard, 1996) and it is an increasing feature in vegetable productions (Olesen, 2003). In 
pesticides risk management, the control of farm inputs includes the prohibition of certain molecules, and, 
conversely, the requirement to use specific active ingredients, and eventually commercial products, the use 
of au[LOLDULHV¶ VSHFLHV 0RQLWRULQJ HQFRPSDVVHV ILHOG YLVLWV RI VWDWLRQ¶V WHFKQLFLDQV WKH FKHFNV RI
crop/spraying information sheets, their centralization at the station and other internal traceability tools. 
Decision rights. When there is little uncertainty on task programmability and a strong correlation between 
agents' effort and output, a food buyer could theoretically design a complete production contract, 
including production practice rules (Jang and Sykuta, 2009). However, environmental uncertainty is a 
salient feature of agricultural production (Allen and Lueck, 2003; Masten, 2000), which often makes it 
impossible to draw up such complete contracts in the real world.  
This is especially true as regards to pesticides safety management, where decisions about chemical 
spraying have to be made according to the evolution of diseases and pest pressure, crop growth, climate 
(kinetic of molecules), and pre-harvest interval. Even for controlled environments such as greenhouses, it 
is impossible to write technical specifications covering all possible events. As a result, to make joint 
adaptation, it may be more efficient to transfer decision rights to the party with the greatest expertise. Hu 
and Hendrikse (2009) show that in the Chinese fruit and vegetables, under contract farming, many 
decision rights are shifted from farmers to firms, including the use of fertilizers and pesticides.  
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In the case of pesticides risk management, these decision rights include the rate (active ingredients per 
hectare) and the date of application. The molecules themselves could be adjusted during the growing 
VHDVRQDFFRUGLQJWRWHFKQLFDOSHVWSUHVVXUHRUFRPPHUFLDOQHHGVFKDQJHLQDFXVWRPHU¶VUHTXLUHPHQWV 
 













Effort to reduce the 
level of pesticides 
residues in fresh fruit 
and vegetables 
Outcome-based incentives 
í Performance reward: Quality-contingent payment 
(bonuses or penalties), downgrading of harvest 
(first choice to off-grade), downgrading for the 
whole campaign, contract termination;  
í Output measurement: Multi and mono-molecule 
residue analysis, residue control plan. 
Administrative controls 
í Input control: Prohibition/requirement to use active 
ingredients, commercial products, auxiliary species; 
í Task monitoring: Field visits, checks of 






Joint adaptation of 
greenhouses and 
packing stations 
Allocation of decision rights 
í Interdependent decisions to manage pesticide risk 
(respect of MRL), e.g. date of chemical application, 
harvest and vegetable shipping. 
Safeguarding 
problem 
Asset specificity  
Specific investments in 
food safety 
management (IPM, 




í Ownership: vertical integration into vegetables 
production; 
í Semi-strong safeguards: long term contract, 




Ownership. The integration within a single property is the most powerful tool to secure highly specific 
investments and dedicated assets (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985). Since the seminal work of 
Monteverde and Teece (1982), numerous empirical studies show that asset specificity is associated with 
forward or backward vertical integration (Klein, 2005; Macher and Richman, 2008; Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997). Firms simultaneously choose the level of specificity and the organization that will provide 
safeguards against the risk of rent appropriation (Williamson, 1985). Reciprocally, vertically-integrated 
firms are well fitted to protect new appropriable investments. For vegetables buyers, vertical integration 
into greenhouse production is therefore a strong mechanism to protect specific investments, on the 
vegetables growing side (IPM and GAP) as on the packing side (brand-name capital and certifications).  
Semi-strong safeguards. Other kinds of safeguard will accommodate medium levels of asset specificity. 
Non-legal enforcement mechanisms include reputation, relational contracting and private arbitration. All 
can help to overcome critical organizational problems in business transactions. Klein (1996) gives insights 
into the "self-enforcing range" of contracts, where the private enforcement capital of firms (i.e. their 
capacity to impose sanctions by threatening to terminate the relatiRQ RU WR GDPDJH WKH RWKHU ILUP¶V
reputation) defines the extent to which parties honor their commitments (for an application in the agri-
8 
 
food sector, see Mazé and Ménard, 2010). In relational contracting, interpersonal trust, norms of 
obligation and cooperation, open communication and the sharing of information are supporting 
transactions (Eccles, 1981; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Community enforcement works well in small 
groups, where low information costs and cultural homogeneity encourage retaliation and black-listing, 
with a risk of losing future business (Richman 2004). In food chains, producer organizations with control 
over decision making are other efficient ways of mitigating moral hazard and externalities (Bijman, 2007; 
Raynaud et al., 2009). Cooperative could also build internal procedures to control free-riding and promote 
collective action. 
1.4. Empirical predictions 
In agri-food chains, processors and distributors are using different governance mechanisms to procure 
agricultural commodities. These mechanisms are more or less suited to mitigate opportunistic behavior 
and induce compliance with product and process food safety requirements. Building on Transaction Cost 
Economics, we put forward two propositions on the influence of vertical linkages on safe farming 
practices and certificates in fresh vegetables. They are empirically tested on the Moroccan tomato chain. 
1. With regard to the performance evaluation problem, we assume that the more the supply chain is 
integrated (from contracted growers to full ownership of greenhouses), the more the control of pesticides 
safety risk will be solved through direct supervision of the production process, rather than outcome-based 
incentives through residues analysis  and penalties (e.g. downgrading of tomato harvest or farm). We 
conducted a survey of tomato packing stations to test this prediction (See section 4 for the main results). 
2. Turning to asset specificity and the rent appropriation problem, our hypothesis is that integrated chains 
are more efficient in safeguarding specific investments, so that advanced integrated pest management 
techniques and good agricultural practices will be more diffused within greenhouses owned by private 
packers, rather than by independent or cooperative producers. A survey of tomato growers has been 
conduced to test the prediction (See section 5 for results). 
2. METHODOLOGY 
As safety risk management can be implemented both at the greenhouse and at the packing station level, 
the analysis must consider the two sides of the chain. Thus, for the purpose of the study, two surveys have 
been performed in the Souss-Massa-Drâa province, a region situated at the West South of Morocco, and 
which produce around 60% of Moroccan tomato (80% of greenhouse production).  
If Moroccan official directories identify fruit and vegetable packing plants, they do not identify vegetables 
producers. Hence, the sampling methodology is different depending on the population considered. The 
survey of producers has been conducted from November 2010 to December 2011 and refers to the 2009-
2010 season. This survey is based on snowball sampling, which consists on a progressive identification of 
the population. As a first step, producers have been identified from interviews with key informants and 
surveyed. These producers had then named others farms, which have been surveyed, and so on. This 
progressive construction allowed surveying 86 tomato growers in the Souss-Massa-Drâa region. 
Administering the questionnaire required first an exploratory stage, where the key players of the fruit and 
vegetables sector have been interviewed. These key players are: GAP and organic farming certifying 
firms, farm input distributors, professional associations, public agencies and governmental departments. 
After this exploratory stage, the questionnaire was tested to validate both its relevance and that questions 
do not lead to confusing answers. The questionnaire has been performed on face-to-face.  
The sampling methodology for the station questionnaire was not defined according to snowball sampling. 
The APEFEL (Moroccan association of fruits and vegetables exporters-producers) inventories 84 fruit and 
vegetable packing plants in the Souss-Massa-Drâa region for the season 2010-2011. First, we surveyed the 
stations whose tomato suppliers were already interviewed. Because all stations were not willing to answer, 
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others firms have been randomly selected in the APEFEL list to reach a total of thirty stations. The survey 
has also been conducted on face-to-face.  
Surveyed packing stations represent 35.7% of the total of packing stations within the Souss region. Three 
types may be considered according to the degree and nature of vertical integration: x Vertically-integrated packing stations, producing all tomato supply on their own farms (therefore 
³LQWHJUDWHGILUP´ x Other privately-owned packing stations, sourcing from different tomato producers (therefore 
³FRQWUDFWRU´Vegetables may be sourced both from external growers and owned farms. x Growers' marketing cooperatives with own packing station.  
The two latter have multiple suppliers. Thereby, despite a fairly good match between the packing stations 
and the producers surveyed3, a matched analysis cannot be performed for statistical reason: indeed, such a 
match would lead in over-representing coops and contractors, in the detriment of integrated firms. 
3. SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT IN MOROCCO 
Morocco fresh produce exports are 90% oriented towards Europe where the main concern of consumers is 
chemical contamination by pesticides used in the production process. This concern has drastically 
increased over the last two decades. Absent pesticide-based market differentiation, control has become the 
key safety management device of public and private entities. While a diversity of private standards has 
developed in particular regarding the production process (GAP standards) and the product (MRL, 
forbidden molecules), a number of significant regulation changes have occurred at the national and EU 
levels (Codron et al, 2006). Changes at the EU level are mainly i) the list of authorized molecules which 
has been extensively revised and drastically reduced; ii) national Maximum Residue Limits for pesticides 
(MRLs) which have been harmonized by EU authorities (Regulation (EC) No 396/2005); iii) greater 
responsibility which has been imposed on food operators at all stages of the chain by the EU Food Law 
Regulation 178/2002 which came into force in 2007; iv) traceability which has been imposed from grower 
field to retailer by the same EU Food Law regulation with applicability from the 1st of January 2005. 
In this section, we will first briefly present the main features of the Moroccan export and distribution 
chain to Europe, and then highlight how and why public and private operators both in Europe and 
Morocco implement and articulate safety control.  
Morocco has a long history of fresh tomato export-oriented production, mainly driven by the French EU 
quota and tariff-based regulation. Exports have varied between 100 kt and 150 kt during a long period 
(from the 1960s to the 1980s). From the early 90s Moroccan exports have started to climb reaching an 
average of 150 kt until the mid 90s, 200 kt in the 2000s and 250 kt in the mid 2000s. In recent years, this 
growth has accelerated and exports are now above 400kt (421 kt in 2009). The recent rapid increase is 
essentially due to the progress of classic loose tomato, which increases from 200,000 tons to 330,000 tons, 
between 2004-2005 and 2008-2009. The effort of diversification of the exporters can be observed by the 
significant breakthrough of the cherry tomato, the exports of which grew from 11,000 tons in 2004-2005 
to almost 50,000 tons in 2009-2010. The cocktail tomato presents a similar trend, while the cluster tomato 
shows certain stagnation in the export.  
France is by far the main market with still around 75% of total volume exported. Diversification is 
significantly developing towards Spain, UK, Switzerland and Russia. Exports to Italia, Netherlands, 
Slovakia and Germany still account each one for less than 1% of total volume. 
Morocco has signed several agreements with the European Commission. The last negotiation was 
completed in 2012 and reinforces Morocco preferential access to European markets for several 
agricultural products. The greatest preference is for tomatoes. The current Moroccan quota is currently 
210,000 tons. Within the next four years, the quota is planned to be increased by 52,000 tons. The 
                                                 
3
 On the 86 growers surveyed, 53 could be unambiguously linked to one of 21 packing stations.  
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minimum entry price for Morocco is considerably lower than for other countries. Resulting from a good 
negotiation that Morocco concluded with the EU in 2003, a general framework of tariff contingency is 
applied to tomatoes imported from Morocco for the period from October to April with a preferential entry 
price of 46.1 Euros/kg and an ad valorem duty of 0 %. Above this contingency, the regime for Most 
Favored Nation is applied.  
Three levels may be considered in the vertical tomato export chain (Figure 3):  x the growing level with about 500 tomato growers; x the packing level with about 80 packing stations providing beyond the technical services related to 
packing, technical assistance and information to growers about pesticides, certification and markets; x the export level with about 15 exporting groups the role of which is i) to negotiate export quotas with 
the government, ii) to ensure the provision of export services, particularly logistics and transportation 
and iii) sometimes to aggregate consignments together under a single marketing strategy. 
 
Figure 3. The markets of fresh tomato in 2009. 
 
Source: Conseil Général du Développement Agricole (2011).  
 
A few of these exporting companies have international strategies and establish in France to better control 
the product flow and sell directly to supermarkets, while a majority of exporters market their products by 
dealing with importers: 90 % of the Moroccan tomato exports transit through French importers.  
A survey carried out by Ubifrance in 2005, shows that Moroccan exporters have a diversity of legal status 
(limited liability companies, co-operatives, etc.) and property rights (cross shareholdings, strategic 
alliances between groups, etc.). Three main types of organization may be identified, discriminating by the 




x Export groups like Maraissa (Azura), Rosaflore (Idyl), Doche (Matysha) or Delassus which are fully 
vertically integrated, from production to import activities. Such groups are characterized by a mixed 
structure of both European and Moroccan capital. They dispose of platforms in Spain or in France 
and may perform a full control of their export activities. x Export groups like Domaines Royaux, Soema (Avryl) or Armona which are only integrated backward 
into production, either through ownership or contracting. With no forward integration into import 
activities, they sell their products through French importers. x Export groups like OCE and Salam which are not integrated, neither forward or backward.  
In the customer country, safety control is performed both by public and private entities. EU public 
agencies require traceability and self control by chain operators. They directly control for compliance with 
MRL standards at the boarder or at further stages in the distribution chain. On the private side, importers 
and supermarket chains are the main players in safety control. Control by importers and retailers are 
achieved through residue analysis over the product and/or control or certification over GAP standards 
*OREDO *$3 1DWXUH &KRLFH $KROG )LOLqUH 4XDOLWp &DUUHIRXU« )XOSRQL  3HVWLFLGH UHVLGXH
analyses are performed to verify that products comply with the public MRL standard. Residue control is 
also performed to comply with the private MRL standards of some European retailers who require more 
stringent standards than public ones.  
A high proportion of North European countries supermarket chains have adopted Global GAP while South 
European countries retailers are only a minority to be Global GAP members and to require Global GAP 
from growers. While GAP standards usually include as a major requirement, a number of residue analysis 
to be performed by growers (one analysis per grower per year and per certified crop for Global GAP), 
most supermarkets usually perform their own analysis by direct sampling at the platform level.  
Depending on the country configuration of Law and market forces, there is more emphasis on GAP 
certification (or control) or on residue private standards and their control (Codron et al, 2006). Forces of 
utmost importance in driving the modalities of control are the criminal liability regime and consumer 
association activism. They differ across countries. While the UK regime is governed by the due diligence 
principle and puts full liability on the retailer (Hobbs and Kerr, 1992; Henson and Caswell, 1999), the 
responsibility in the French liability regime rests on the first agent to introduce the product in the French 
supply chain (Art. L 221-1; Art. L 212 -1, French Consumption Law). However, in case of retailer 
branding, the retailer is considered as the first agent to introduce and therefore bears full liability. 
Consumer NGO activism also widely differs across European countries, reaching its highest levels in 
countries like Austria, Germany or Netherlands.  
Configurations with emphasis on GAP certificates are more specific of countries like UK with liability 
regimes fully relying on retailers. Within such a liability regime, retailers need to supervise the whole 
import supply chain and look for governance solutions that minimize their safety risk (Holleran et al, 
1999; Henson and Hooker, 2001). A first option is to delegate safety control to large-scale export firms. A 
second option is to impose private standards on all their suppliers (GlobalGAP). This last option tends to 
be prevailing as long as suppliers from developing country are not yet all large-sized firms. 
Configurations with emphasis on residue analysis are more specific of countries with a high degree of 
consumer NGO activism (countries like Germany). Of course, both types of control may co-exist within a 
private safety management strategy/policy. In countries like France or Spain, where GlobalGAP is not 
required by retailers and where activism is weak, safety risk management greatly varies across retailers 
(Codron et al, 2002). Retailers differ by the modalities and the number of residue analysis. They may also 
implement individual proprietary GAP standards. More pressure of control is of course exercised on 
growers as soon as private branding is at stake. 
At the importer level, control greatly depends on the level of vertical integration. As soon as there is tight 
coordination within a stable relationship between the importer and the exporter or between the importer, 
the exporter and the grower, control over the production process is easier and allows for reduction of 
control over the product. At the importer collective level, public/private co-regulation is sometimes 
implemented for residue control. It is the case in France where importers who bear full responsibility 
according to the criminal liability regime and are imposed self-monitoring since 1998 at the national level, 
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collectively organize under public agencies supervision to perform the boarder safety control. They have 
signed a collective agreement in which they commit to achieve a given number of residue analysis. The 
collective arrangement is voluntary and allows for better efficiency and reduction of residue analysis cost 
control (Codron et al, 2007). 
Private and public actors of the Morocco fresh produce export chain have been long aware that safety is a 
key challenge for competitiveness on export markets, in particular EU markets. Exporters individually and 
collectively organize to comply with EU regulation (traceability, MRL and forbidden molecules) and 
private customers standards (at the grower level, GAP certificates and extra MRL).  
While the response to private GAP and residue standards is mostly individual (see further the findings of 
our survey), efforts to comply with residue constraints are also collective, given the potential negative 
externalities that arise when an exporter is controlled at the EU boarder with an excess of residues 
(Codron et al, 2003). As a result, the whole export chain has organized into efficient4 collective structures 
of safety control, in particular EACCE and LOARC (Codron et al, 2012b).  
EACCE controls residues on exported fruits and vegetable at the packing level and, in some litigious 
cases, at the field level. Controls are systematic. In 2009/2010, 1,498 samples of vegetables were taken. 
The group of pesticides to be analyzed in a sample is decided by EACCE inspectors, depending on the last 
pesticides recorded by the producer. Produce are usually exported before the analytical result is known. 
When non-compliance is identified, EACCE writes to the exporter concerned and stops any future export 
of produce coming from the same plot of the farm. EACCE requests an explanation from the exporter, 
including data on traceability and records of pesticide applications. EACCE does not consider informing 
the EU importer. EACCE owns six analysis laboratories, located in the main regions of production of 
Morocco. Two laboratories, in Casablanca and Agadir, are accredited according to ISO 17025 by the 
French Accreditation Body COFRAC. EACCE plans to achieve accreditation of the remaining 
laboratories in 2012. Accreditation provides control flexibility for Moroccan products at their entry in the 
European market, especially at the French border city of Perpignan.  
4. PACKING STATIONS 
Vegetable packing stations have different legal status and vertical organization. Among the stations that 
we surveyed, 8 are cooperatives, the other 22 have a private status. In this last group, we distinguish 
between integrated firms (8) and contractors (14) that are supplied by multiple independent growers. A 
gradient of integration can thus be defined from the less integrated form (contractor) to the most 
(integrated firm). The cooperative is an intermediate organizational form, where different growers have 
their packing outlet in common property. The underlying assumption of our study is that the more the 
station is vertically integrated, the more safety risk management is based on administrative controls rather 
than on outcome-based incentives. 
For all stations surveyed, more than 95% of the tomato production is exported (Table 2). We observe that 
integrated firms have the most important level of production with on average 14,000 tons, while for the 
others the figure is around 10,500 tons. For pesticide residue control, integrated stations realize 68 multi-
residue analysis and 120 mono-residue analysis. These stations have a low control pressure for multi-
residue analysis, with 23 analyses for every 10.000 tons. Conversely, cooperatives have a higher control 
pressure for multi-residues with around 100 analyses per ton5. The result on pesticide analysis suggests 
that hierarchies are indeed performing less output measurement than hybrid organizations.  
                                                 
4Only 13 cases of rejection of Moroccan fresh produce (no one of them concerns tomatoes) reported by the EU 
RASSF (Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed  http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/rapidalert/index_en.htm) database for 
the last three years (01/01/2008 until 28/10/2011) while the non compliance rate was 2% (DG-SANCO 2011-6027). 
5Note that the average number of analysis by farm supplying the cooperative is less than 10, lower than for integrated 
firms (68). However the comparison is misleading, since the latter often own many farms, with a larger total 
greenhouse area. An example is AZURA, a vertically-integrated exporter that owns 25 tomato farms in the region. 
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However, contrary to our hypothesis, no relation exists between food chain organization and the intensity 
of sanctions. Two indicators of the intensity of sanctions in case of safety non-compliance have been 
defined: on one hand, the intensity of sanction for the supplier in case of punctual non-compliance (on a 
tomato lot); on the other hand the intensity of sanction in case of recurrent anomalies during the growing 
season. In the two cases, we observe that sanctions are not statistically different whatever the organization. 
Going to the agricultural practices, we observe that the more the station is integrated and the more it drives 
production. For pesticide management, we created a scale that measure the intensity of requirements from 
the station to the grower: the scale goes from 1 if there is no requirement at all to 3 if there are 
requirements in terms of active ingredient, pesticides brands, and also application periods. While the 
average indicator is 2.43 for integrated firms, it is only 1.88 for cooperatives stations; however the 
difference is statistically non significant. 
 
Table 2. Product safety management. 
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 Blank: non-significant; * p< 0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
 
Conversely, while forward-integrated organizations provide more command to their farm managers, they 
perform less pesticide residue control plan than cooperatives, for which this control is systematic (Table 
3). Stations can also require from their growers to be certified. We observe differences between 
organizations, albeit not statistically significant according to Pearson¶V Chi-square test. While integrated 
firms required more frequently than RWKHUV7HVFR1DWXUH¶V&KRLFH1XUWXUH) and GlobalGAP certification, 
cooperatives and contractors insist more on organic farming certificate. Beyond requirements on chemical 
SURWHFWLRQDQG*$3FHUWLILFDWLRQVWDWLRQVDUHDOVRLQYROYHGLQWKHGLUHFWLRQRIWRPDWRJURZHUV¶SUDFWLFHV
via the monitoring of greenhouse crop sheets, and the provision of advices on pest and diseases control: 
UHJXODU FURS QHZVOHWWHUV RU ILHOG YLVLWV E\ WKH VWDWLRQ¶V TXDOLW\ PDQDJHU We can observe that the 
monitoring of producers via crop sheets is more frequent for cooperatives than for other packing stations. 
Once implemented, the sheets are almost systematically centralized at the headquarters for traceability 
reason. Considering the technical advice to producers, we can note that cooperatives and integrated firms 
develop the same actions. Both send a quality manager to visit farms and both send a regular newsletter. 
Contractors realize more field visits to farms (93%, against 75% for others). In the same way, there are 




To summarize the results, regardless of vertical organization, Moroccan packing stations are strongly 
LQYROYHGLQWKHPDQDJHPHQWRIWKHLUVXSSOLHUV¶IDUPSUDFWLFHV6tations manage differently depending to 
their extent of chain integration, albeit these differences are not statistically significant (See test in last 
column, Table 3). 
As greenhouses, packing plants can be certified. IFS (International Features Standard) Food and BRC 
(British Retail Consortium) µGlobal Standard for Food Safety¶ are the two most important food safety 
certificates worldwide. Considering IFS, we observe that the more the station is integrated, the more likely 
it has implemented this certificate (28.6% against less than 15% for other groups). As regards to marketing 
strategies, almost all stations develop their own proprietary brand. The only difference observed is in the 
frequency of private brands developed for customers (distributors, supermarkets, exporting groups, etc.), 
which are more likely implemented by integrated firms than by the others. 
 





N Frequency 3HDUVRQ¶V 
Chi2 test Contractor Cooperative Integrated 
firm 
All Contractor Cooperative Integrated 
firm 
All 
Own brand 14 8 6 28 100.00% 100.00% 85.70% 96.60% n.s. 
Other brands 
(e.g. retailer) 
4 4 4 12 28.60% 50.00% 57.10% 41.40% n.s. 
Any GAP 
certificate 
14 8 7 29 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% n.s. 
Organic 
farming 
0 2 1 3 0.00% 25.00% 14.30% 10.30% n.s. 
TNC 2 3 3 8 14.30% 37.50% 42.90% 27.60% n.s. 
GlobalGAP 13 7 7 27 92.90% 87.50% 100.00% 93.10% n.s. 
Frequent field 
visits 
13 6 5 24 92.90% 75.00% 71.40% 82.80% n.s. 
Regular  
newsletter 
9 2 2 13 64.30% 25.00% 28.60% 44.80% n.s. 
Crop sheet 9 7 5 21 64.30% 87.50% 71.40% 72.40% n.s. 
Centralization 
of crop sheets 
12 8 7 27 85.70% 100.00% 100.00% 93.10% n.s. 
Residue 
control plan 
12 8 6 26 85.70% 100.00% 85.70% 89.70% n.s. 
IFS 2 1 2 5 14.30% 12.50% 28.60% 17.20% n.s. 
BRC 12 6 6 24 85.70% 75.00% 85.70% 82.80% n.s. 
All (column) 14 8 7 29 100% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% n.s. 
%5&%ULWLVK5HWDLO&RQVRUWLXP,)6,QWHUQDWLRQDO)HDWXUHV6WDQGDUG71&7HVFR1DWXUH¶V&KRLFH. 
n.s.: non-significant. 
5. TOMATO PRODUCERS 
The key questions of the research are to determine to what extent greenhouse producers manage pesticides 
safety risk and how the differences could be explained. We have considered two advanced safe practices, 
first the fact that producers use or not biocontrol of insects with auxiliaries, and second the fact that they 
are or not GlobalGAP certified. The first practice is considered as such, with the adopter and non-adopter 
categories, while for the second one, three groups have been defined: 
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x Early adopters, those who were certified before 2007. x Followers, certified between 2007 and 2010. x Non adopters. 
 
In 2010, 80% of producers of the sample of producers were GlobalGAP certified and fell into the first two 
groups, half in each one. To validate the relevance of the arbitrary break-up between early adopters and 
followers, two others thresholds have been tested: 2006 and 2008. The stability of the empirical results 
confirms the initial choice. In the same way, considering the two criteria of safety management proved to 
be important because both bring specific information. Indeed, if 50% of producers using auxiliaries could 
be classified as GlobalGAP early adopter and 40% as followers, followers are a heterogeneous population 
in terms of biocontrol. This heterogeneity justifies taking into account these two in our analysis. 
As regards to explanatory variables, the management of the safety risk can be apprehended through five 
indicators: (i) the individual characteristics of farmers, (ii) the structural characteristics of their farms, (ii) 
(iii) their perception about the production risks linked to pests and diseases, (iv) the intervention of a third-
party in the safety risk management, and (v) the chain organization, which is the motivation of the 
research. In the following paragraphs, the indicators will be analyzed successively. 
Considering the structural characteristics of farm estates, we note that, on average, producers have an 
utilizable agricultural area (UAA) of around 70 ha, of which 50 ha are dedicated to greenhouse production 
(See Table 4 and Table 5 in appendix for statistical tests). Producers with an advanced safety management 
scheme are largest than the others. While the agricultural area for producers with auxiliaries is about 90 
ha, the average for non-users is beyond 25 ha. The same gap is observed if we consider the greenhouse 
area: 70 ha against only 20 ha. This last difference is explained by the overall structure, because the 
proportion of farm land dedicated to greenhouse production is 75% on average for all producers, 
regardless if they use or not auxiliaries, and there is no significant difference between of the percentage of 
land dedicated to greenhouse. In short, producers using biocontrol are larger, but no more specialized on 
greenhouse production than other producers. 
We also observe a difference in terms of size considering the gradient of GlobalGAP adoption. Early 
adopters differ sharply from others:  their agricultural area is 2.25 times higher than the area of followers, 
and four times higher than the area of the non-certified farms. The result is observed considering 
greenhouse area. However - and conversely to producers using auxiliaries - primary adopters are slightly 
more specialized on greenhouse production than others, with a rate of 65% against 50%. The size effect is 
logically also observed through the labor employed on farms. The structural characteristics (size in terms 
of land and labor) are not correlated with higher crop productivity. Indeed, on average, loose classic 
tomato yield is about 185 tons per ha for all producer categories.  
Considering individual characteristics of farmers who develop such management schemes, we note that 
they are older and more educated. They have more often a second, non-agricultural activity: 72% of 
biocontrol adopters declare an external activity, against 50% for non-users. In the same way, 75% of 
Global GAP early adopters have another source of income, while they are less than 50% for the others. 
These results on pesticide safety risk management are consistent with the adoption/diffusion literature, 
which concludes that structural and individual characteristics of farms are key factors of sustainable 
practices in agriculture. 
The main objective of greenhouse safety risk management is to meet fresh vegetable chain requirements. 
The benefits of adoption will therefore be higher for the grower, if the change in farm practices is 
associated with traceability and quality control. Two indicators may be considered: the realization of an 
external farm audit by a third-party (different from the requirements of GlobalGAP and other safety 
certificates) and the implementation of an internal residue control plan. Data show that almost of 
producers have implemented a residue control plan. However, the figure is different for the external audit: 
tomato growers with advanced safety risk management are more likely to pay for such an audit than 
others. Hence, around a third of producers using auxiliaries are audited, while no non-user. In the same 




















25 61 35 36 15 86 
1. Farmer characteristics 
Age of farmer 46.32 53.47 54.06 50.46 47.27 51.35 
Education 3.44 3.88 3.94 3.69 3.43 3.75 
Other sources of income (%) 52 72 74 64 53 66 
Coop membership (%) 64 57 63 53 67 59 
2. Farm characteristics 
Total farm area (ha) 23.43 88.84 108.31 48.83 30.40 69.82 
Greenhouse area (ha) 18.26 68.58 94.89 27.24 22.55 53.95 
Total labor 16.64 50.41 61.86 24.92 28.60 40.59 
Area under full property (%) 51.54 55.65 53.41 56.46 52.10 54.46 
Tomato (% of UAA) 52.89 58.74 65.61 54.48 43.20 57.04 
Greenhouse (%  of UAA) 77.41 73.71 82.81 69.62 68.42 74.78 
Loose classic tomato (% of 
tomato area) 
52 45 46 50 43 47 
Loose classic tomato yield 
(tons per ha) 
194.42 184.34 184.72 185.88 196.57 187.27 
3. Risk assessment 
Disease pressure (scale: 1-10) 1.40 1.88 2.01 1.54 1.58 1.74 
Pest pressure (scale: 1-10) 2.29 2.79 3.00 2.41 2.37 2.64 
4. Third-party 
External quality audit (%) 0 28 23 22 7 20 
Residue control plan (%) 96 98 100 100 87 98 
5. Food chain organization 
Integrated firm (%) 16.00 49.98 51.43 27.78 6.67 33.72 
 
The literature on integrated pest management shows that biotic and abiotic factors also influence farmer 
decision making. Our hypothesis was that the differences in phytosanitary pressure may explain the rate of 
IPM adoption within vegetable growers. Two synthetic indicators are used, one for pests and one for 
diseases, calculated from a self-assessment of different species. Pests considered in the questionnaire are 
the main pests in Moroccan tomato greenhouses: mites, whiteflies, moths, Tuta absoluta and nematodes; 
diseases considered are Alternaria, anthracnose, bacteriose, botrytis, cladosporiose, fusariose, downy 
mildew, powdery mildew and black narrox. For each species, the producer provided a risk assessment 
from 1 to 10 on a ten-point scale. Synthetic risk indicators for pests and diseases are computed from the 
non-weighted average of all listed species. These two indicators are considered separately, because of their 
mediocre correlation (57%). Overall, the risks remain low, below 2 on average for diseases and 3 for pests. 
We observe that producers with advanced safety management perceive higher risks, both in terms of 
tomato pests and diseases. One explanation is that IPM and good agricultural practices are not only 
implemented to manage food safety risk and get market access, but they are also more efficient techniques 
than chemical protection to tackle high phytosanitary pressure. However, at least for insects, there is a 
reverse causal explanation: these alternative techniques (particularly biocontrol) need fine-tuning and do 
not suppress the risk but maintain low population of insects, whereas the objective of chemical protection 





Last but not the least, to answer our second research question, we studied the influence of food chain 
organization on the adoption of IPM and safety certificates. Tomato growers are differentiated depending 
on their degree of integration within the chain, in a typology consistent with TCE and the former 
classification of packing stations: x Vertically-LQWHJUDWHGSURGXFHUVIURPJUHHQKRXVHSURGXFWLRQWRSDFNLQJ³LQWHJUDWHGILUP´7KHIDUP
owner is the sole owner of the station, or the co-owner with non farming associates. x Contractors, which are delivering tomato to private stations in which they have no stakes. x Cooperators, which are members of a cooperative and deliver to a cooperative station. 
A few producers have declared no affiliation to any packing station; in such a case, no information is 
indicated concerning their organizational pattern.  
The results of statistical analysis are that integrated firms are more likely to be advanced growers in terms 
of safety management. We observe an over-representation of producers using auxiliaries (50% versus 
16%) and GAP early adopters (51% versus 27% for the followers and 7% for the others). The differences 
are statistically significant (Last raw in Table 5). 
CONCLUSION 
The literature is basically silent on the influence of marketing and supplier-buyer linkages on the adoption 
of integrated pest management and good practice certificates in agriculture. Also, to date, little empirical 
work has been done on the governance mechanisms used by vegetable buyers to manage pesticide safety 
risk jointly with growers, and more specifically their choice between product or process control, with 
eventually the allocation of decision rights. The governance mechanisms of vegetable packers are indeed 
more or less suited to mitigate opportunistic behavior and induce compliance with food safety 
requirements. 
Our paper tackles those two issues. Based on surveys made in the Moroccan fresh tomato export chain, it 
provides empirical evidence that the organization of the food chain is an important and often overlooked 
feature of safety control.  
The survey of fresh vegetable packers in the Souss-Massa-Drâa province provides mixed results about our 
first hypothesis: that the more the supply chain is integrated (from contracted growers to full ownership), 
the more the control of pesticide safety risk is be solved through direct supervision, rather than outcome-
based incentives.  
The survey of early tomato producers which are large size growers with cropping and marketing behavior 
very similar to those of developed countries provides more salient and original results. While it confirms 
the role of traditional factors influencing sustainable farming practice adoption (e.g. farm structures, 
grower education), it shows that vertical organization plays a significant role on adoption. In particular, it 
shows that integrated chains are more efficient in safeguarding specific investments, which enables to put 
forward that advanced integrated pest management techniques and good agricultural practices are more 
diffused within greenhouses owned by private packers, rather than within greenhouses of independent and 
cooperative growers. 
A main limit of the study is the rather small number of firms surveyed. The size of the packing house 
sample is certainly an explanation of our rather inconclusive results regarding the choice between strong 
incentives and direct supervision. For statistical reason, a match between grower and station data was not 
performed. Such a combined analysis would answer the question of whether the wider diffusion of 
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Table 5. Characteristics of sustainable farming adopters. 
 
T-test and chi-square test 1 Auxiliaries GlobalGAP 
Reference: Early adopters Others vs 
followers Followers Others 
Age of farmer ***  **  
Education *** * **  
Other sources of income (%) *    
Coop membership (%)     
Total farm area (ha) *** *** ***  
Greenhouse area (ha) ***  ***  
Total labor **    
Area under full property (%)  *   
Tomato (% of UAA)  ** **  
Greenhouse (%  of UAA)   **  
Loose classic tomato (% of tomato area)     
Loose classic tomato yield (tons per ha)     
External quality audit (%) ***    
Residue control plan (%)   ** * 
Disease pressure (scale: 1-10) *** **   
Pest pressure (scale: 1-10) *** **   
Integrated firm (%) ** ** *** * 
1
 Blank: non-significant; * p< 0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
 
